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Abstract. We present a completeness result for a logical system which
combines stit logic and justification logic in order to represent proving ac-
tivity of the agents. This logic is interpreted over the semantics introduced
in [7]. We define a Hilbert-style axiomatic system for this logic and show
that this system is strongly complete relative to the intended semantics.
stit logic, justification logic, completeness, compactness
1 Introduction
Stit logic of justification announcements (JA-STIT) is a formalism for reasoning
about proving activity of agents which combines expressive powers of stit logic (see
e.g. [4]) with those of justification logic (see e.g. [2]). The two latter logics provide
for the pure agency side and the pure proof ontology side of the proving activity,
respectively, so that it is assumed that doing something is in effect seeing to it that
something is the case, and that every actual proof can be understood as a realization
of some proof polynomial from justification logic. The only missing element in this
picture is then the link between the two components, i.e. how agents can see to it
that a proof is realized. Such a realization may come in different forms, researchers
may, for example, exchange emails or put the proofs they have found on a common
whiteboard. In stit logic of justification announcements this rather common situation
is idealized in that only public proving activity of agents is taken into account. In other
words, taking up the whiteboard metaphor, the agents in question can only participate
in proving activity by putting their proofs on the common whiteboard for everyone
to see, and not by sending one another private messages or scribbling in their private
notebooks. Therefore, the only type of communicative actions within this idealized
community turns out to be a variant of public announcement of proof polynomials.1
1Even though this type of public announcement actions plays a central role in our logic, finding
any sort of meaningful connection to the well-known public announcement logic (PAL) looks like a
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This idealization lends the medium of public announcement, i.e. the metaphorical
community whiteboard, the status of the only interface between the agentive efforts of
the community and the abstract realm of proofs. Proof polynomials may end up being
presented on the whiteboard, and the agents may see to it that this or that particular
proof is presented there. The whiteboard itself is also idealized in that we assume that
there is always enough space on it to put up another proof, and that every proof, once
on the whiteboard, remains there forever.
The language of stit logic of justification announcements then combines the full
sets of justification and stit modalities with a new modality Et which says that the
proof polynomial t is presented to the community (or, to continue with the whiteboard
metaphor, that t is put on the community whiteboard). In this way arises a non-trivial
and expressively rich logic, and the main purpose of the present paper is to provide a
strongly complete axiomatization for this logic.
The layout of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we define the language
and the semantics of the logic at hand. We also briefly characterize its relations with
other formalisms combining the resources of justification logic and stit logic, studied
in the earlier publications, namely, in [7] and [8]. We mention that the finite model
property fails for the stit logic of justification announcements in a rather strong form,
and show that the language of JA-STIT is expressive enough to distinguish between
the full class of justification stit models and the class of justification stit models based
on discrete time.
The system of axioms for JA-STIT is then presented in Section 3. We immediately
show this system to be sound w.r.t. the semantics introduced in Section 2, and deduce
some theorems in the system.
Section 4 then contains the bulk of technical work necessary for the proof of com-
pleteness of the presented axiomatization w.r.t. the class of normal jstit models. It
gives a stepwise construction and adequacy check for all the numerous components of
the canonical model and ends with a proof of a truth lemma. Section 5 then gives a
concise proof of the completeness result and draws some quick corollaries including the
compactness property.
Then follows Section 6, giving some conclusions and drafting directions for future
work.
In what follows we will be assuming, due to space limitations, a basic acquaintance
with both stit logic and justification logic. We recommend to peruse [5, Ch. 2] for a
quick introduction to the basics of stit logic, and [1] for the same w.r.t. justification
logic.
non-trivial matter. One obvious reason for this is the difference between the underlying action logics
(stit logic in the case at hand vs. dynamic logic of PAL). Another reason is that we are studying public
announcements of a special type of objects (i.e. proof polynomials) in a multi-agent setting, whereas
in PAL sentence announcements are studied, and these sentence announcements are not tied to a
particular agent. Moreover, in JA-STIT public announcements are not reducible to static formulas
and are actually intended to be that way.
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2 Basic definitions and notation
2.1 Preliminaries
We fix some preliminaries. First, we choose a finite set Ag disjoint from all the
other sets to be defined below. Individual agents from this set will be denoted by
letters i and j. Then we fix countably infinite sets PV ar of proof variables (denoted
by x, y, z, w, u) and PConst of proof constants (denoted by a, b, c, d). When needed,
subscripts and superscripts will be used with the above notations or any other notations
to be introduced in this paper. Set Pol of proof polynomials is then defined by the
following BNF:
t := x | c | s+ t | s× t |!t,
with x ∈ PV ar, c ∈ PConst, and s, t ranging over elements of Pol. In the above
definition, + stands for the sum of proofs, × denotes application of its left argument to
the right one, and ! denotes the so-called proof-checker, so that !t checks the correctness
of proof t.
In order to define the set Form of formulas, we fix a countably infinite set V ar of
propositional variables to be denoted by letters p, q, r, s. Formulas themselves will be
denoted by letters A,B,C,D, and the definition of Form is supplied by the following
BNF:
A := p | A ∧B | ¬A | [j]A | ✷A | t:A | KA | Et,
with p ∈ V ar, j ∈ Ag and t ∈ Pol.
It is clear from the above definition of Form that we are considering a version of
modal propositional language. As for the informal interpretations of modalities, [j]A
is the so-called cstit action modality and ✷ is the historical necessity modality; both
modailities are borrowed from stit logic. The next two modailities, KA and t:A, come
from justification logic and the latter is interpreted as “t proves A”, whereas the former
is the strong epistemic modality “A is known”.
We assume ✸ as notation for the dual modality of ✷. As usual, ω will denote the
set of natural numbers including 0, ordered in the natural way.
2.2 Semantics
For the language at hand, we assume the following semantics. A justification stit
(or jstit, for short) model is a structure
M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉
such that:
1. Tree is a non-empty set. Elements of Tree are called moments.
2. ✂ is a partial order on Tree for which a temporal interpretation is assumed. We
will also freely use notations like ☎, ✁, and ✄ to denote the inverse relation and
the irreflexive companions.2
2A more common notation ≤ is not convenient for us since we also widely use ≤ in this paper to
denote the natural order relation between elements of ω.
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3. Hist(M) is a set of maximal ✂-chains in Tree. Since Hist(M) is completely
determined by Tree and ✂, it is not included into the model structure as a sep-
arate component. Elements of Hist(M) are called histories. The set of histories
containing a given moment m will be denoted Hm. The following set:
MH(M) = {(m,h) | m ∈ Tree, h ∈ Hm},
called the set of moment-history pairs, will be used to evaluate the elements of
Form.
4. Choice is a function mapping Tree × Agent into 22
Hist
in such a way that for
any given j ∈ Agent and m ∈ Tree we have as Choice(m, j) (to be denoted
as Choicemj below) a partition of Hm. For a given h ∈ Hm we will denote by
Choicemj (h) the element of partition Choice
m
j containing h.
5. Act is a function mapping MH(M) into 2Pol.
6. R and Re are two pre-order on Tree giving two versions of epistemic accessibility
relation. They are assumed to be connected by inclusion R ⊆ Re.
7. E is a function mapping Tree× Pol into 2Form.
8. V is the evaluation function, mapping the set V ar into 2MH(M).
However, not all structures of the above described type are admitted as jstit models.
A number of additional restrictions needs to be satisfied. More precisely, we assume
satisfaction of the following constraints:
1. Historical connection:
(∀m,m1 ∈ Tree)(∃m2 ∈ Tree)(m2 ✂m ∧m2 ✂m1).
2. No backward branching:
(∀m,m1,m2 ∈ Tree)((m1 ✂m ∧m2 ✂m)→ (m1 ✂m2 ∨m2 ✂m1)).
3. No choice between undivided histories:
(∀m,m′ ∈ Tree)(∀h, h′ ∈ Hm)(m✁m
′∧m′ ∈ h∩h′ → Choicemj (h) = Choice
m
j (h
′))
for every j ∈ Agent.
4. Independence of agents:
(∀m ∈ Tree)(∀f : Ag → 2Hm)((∀j ∈ Ag)(f(j) ∈ Choicemj )⇒
⋂
j∈Ag
f(j) 6= ∅).
5. Monotonicity of evidence:
(∀t ∈ Pol)(∀m,m′ ∈ Tree)(Re(m,m
′)⇒ E(m, t) ⊆ E(m′, t)).
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6. Evidence closure properties. For arbitrarym ∈ Tree, s, t ∈ Pol and A,B ∈ Form
it is assumed that:
(a) A→ B ∈ E(m, s) ∧ A ∈ E(m, t)⇒ B ∈ E(m, s× t);
(b) E(m, s) ∪ E(m, t) ⊆ E(m, s+ t).
(c) A ∈ E(m, t)⇒ t : A ∈ E(m, !t);
7. Expansion of presented proofs:
(∀m,m′ ∈ Tree)(m′ ✁m⇒ ∀h ∈ Hm(Act(m
′, h) ⊆ Act(m,h))).
8. No new proofs guaranteed:
(∀m ∈ Tree)(
⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h)) ⊆
⋃
m′✁m,h∈Hm
(Act(m′, h))).
9. Presenting a new proof makes histories divide:
(∀m ∈ Tree)(∀h, h′ ∈ Hm)((∃m
′
✄m)(m′ ∈ h∩h′)⇒ (Act(m,h) = Act(m,h′))).
10. Future always matters:
✂ ⊆ R.
11. Presented proofs are epistemically transparent:
(∀m,m′ ∈ Tree)(Re(m,m
′)⇒ (
⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h)) ⊆
⋂
h′∈H
m′
(Act(m′, h′)))).
We offer some intuitive explanation for the above defined notion of jstit model.
Jstit models were introduced in [7] for the logics based on the combination of stit and
justification modalities. Due to space limitations, we only explain the intuitions behind
jstit models very briefly, and we urge the reader to consult [7, Section 3] for a more
comprehensive explanations, whenever needed.
The components like Tree, ✂, Choice and V are inherited from stit logic, whereas
R, Re, and E come from justification logic. The only new component is the function
Act, which gives out, to take up the whiteboard metaphor, the current state of this
whiteboard at any given moment under any given history. When interpreting Act, we
draw on the classical stit distinction between dynamic (agentive) and static (moment-
determinate) entities, assuming that the presence of a given proof polynomial t on the
community whiteboard only becomes an accomplished fact at m when t is present in
Act(m,h) for every h ∈ Hm. On the other hand, if t is in Act(m,h) only for some
h ∈ Hm this means that t is rather in a dynamic state of being presented, rather than
being present, to the community.
The numbered list of semantical constraints above then just builds on these in-
tuitions. Constraints 1–4 are borrowed from stit logic, constraints 5 and 6 are in-
herited from justification logic. Constraint 7 just says that nothing gets erased from
the whiteboard, constraint 8 says a new proof cannot spring into existence as a static
(i.e. moment-determinate) feature of the environment out of nothing, but rather has
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to come as a result (or a by-product) of a previous activity. Constraint 9 is just a
corollary to constraint 3 in the richer environment of jstit models, constraint 10 says
that the possible future of the given moment is always epistemically relevant in this
moment, and constraint 11 says that the community immediately knows everything
that has firmly made its way onto the whiteboard.
For the members of Form, we will assume the following inductively defined satis-
faction relation. For every jstit model M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉 and for
every (m,h) ∈MH(M) we stipulate that:
M,m, h |= p⇔ (m,h) ∈ V (p);
M,m, h |= [j]A⇔ (∀h′ ∈ Choicemj (h))(M,m, h
′ |= A);
M,m, h |= ✷A⇔ (∀h′ ∈ Hm)(M,m, h
′ |= A);
M,m, h |= KA⇔ ∀m′∀h′(R(m,m′)&h′ ∈ Hm′ ⇒M,m
′, h′ |= A);
M,m, h |= t:A⇔ A ∈ E(m, t)&(∀m′ ∈ Tree)(Re(m,m
′)&h′ ∈ Hm′ ⇒M,m
′, h′ |= A);
M,m, h |= Et⇔ t ∈ Act(m,h).
In the above clauses we assume that p ∈ V ar; we also assume standard clauses for
the Boolean connectives. We further assume standard definitions for satisfiability and
validity of formulas and sets of formulas in the presented semantics.
One can in principle simplify the above semantics by introducing the additional
constraint that Re ⊆ R. This leads to a collapse of the two epistemic accessibility
relation into one. Therefore, we will call jstit models satisfying Re ⊆ R unirelational
jstit models. It is known that such a simplification in the context of pure justification
logic does not affect the set of theorems (see, e.g. [6] and [2, Comment 6.5]), and we will
show that this is also the case within the more expressive environment of JA-STIT.
In fact, the canonical model to be constructed in our completeness is unirelational,
therefore, we offer some comments as to the simplifications of semantics available in
the unirelational setting.
We observe that one can equivalently define a unirelational jstit model as a structure
M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R, E , V 〉 satisfying all the constraints for the jstit models,
except that in the numbered constraints one substitutes R for Re. Also, in the context
of unirelational jstit models, it is possible to simplify the satisfation clause for t:A as
follows:
M,m, h |= t:A⇔ A ∈ E(m, t)&M,m, h |= KA.
Before we move on, we briefly clarify the relation of JA-STIT to other logics based
on the combination of justification and stit modalities to be found in the existing
literature. Firstly, JA-STIT is a fragment of the logic introduced in [8] under the name
‘logic of E-notions’. The difference is that in the logic of E-notions an implicit version
of Et-modality is also present. This implicit version comes in the format EA, where
A ∈ Form and has the meaning that some proof of A is presented to the community.
The satisfaction clause for this additional modality looks as follows:
M,m, h |= EA⇔ (∃t ∈ Pol)(t ∈ Act(m,h)&M,m, h |= t:A).
It is pretty obvious that EA is not definable using expressive powers of JA-STIT, so
that JA-STIT is a proper fragment of the logic of E-notions.
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Another natural logic featuring the full set of justification and stit modalities is
the basic jstit logic introduced in [7] and further explored in [8]. This logic is also
interpreted over the class of jstit models which facilitates the comparison. In basic
jstit logic justification and stit modalities are augmented with the following set of four
modalities representing different modes of proving activity:
Notation Informal interpretation
Prove(j, A) Agent j proves A
Prove(j, t, A) Agent j proves A by t
Proven(A) A has been proven
Proven(t, A) A has been proven by t
In the above table, A ∈ Form, t ∈ Pol and j ∈ Ag are designating the type and
arrangement of arguments for the listed modalities. It turns out that two of these four
modalities, namely Prove(j, t, A) and Proven(t, A) are definable in JA-STIT. These
modalities are interpreted by the following satisfaction clauses:
M,m, h |= Prove(j, t, A)⇔ (∀h′ ∈ Choicemj (h))(t ∈ Act(m,h
′)&M,m, h |= t:A)&
&(∃h′′ ∈ Hm)(t /∈ Act(m,h
′′));
M,m, h |= Proven(t, A)⇔ (∀h′ ∈ Hm)(t ∈ Act(m,h
′)&M,m, h |= t:A)
It is easy to see then that these modalities can be defined within JA-STIT as follows:
Prove(j, t, A) =df [j]Et ∧✸¬Et ∧ t:A;
Proven(t, A) =df ✷Et ∧ t:A.
However, as for the other two modalities of the basic jstit logic, their indefinabil-
ity within JA-STIT is rather obvious and can be easily shown. On the other hand,
Et-modality itself does not seem to be definable within the basic jstit logic. Given
all these facts, the relation between JA-STIT and the basic jstit logic can be de-
scribed as follows. The fragment of basic jstit logic given by the two modalities
{Prove(j, t, A), P roven(t, A)} plus the set of stit and justification modalities can be
faithfully recovered within JA-STIT. This is a maximal fragment of basic jstit logic
that can be recovered within JA-STIT, and JA-STIT itself is a proper extension of
this fragment in terms of expressive power. In the other direction, Et-modality cannot
be recovered within basic jstit logic, which means that only those fragments of JA-
STIT can be recovered within basic jstit logic which are confined to combinations of
modalities borrowed directly from justification and stit logics.
2.3 Concluding remarks
Before we start with the task of axiomatizing JA-STIT, we briefly mention some
facts about its expressive powers which are relevant to our chosen format of com-
pleteness proof. Firstly, it is worth noting that under the presented semantics some
satisfiable formulas cannot be satisfied over finite models, or even over infinite models
where all histories are finite. The argument for this is the same as in implicit fragment
of basic jstit logic, for which this claim was proved in [9] using K(✸p ∧ ✸¬p) as an
example of a formula which is satisfiable over jstit models but not over jstit models
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with finite histories. This already rules out some methods of proving completeness like
filtration method.
Secondly, it turns out that, even though JA-STIT is not, strictly speaking, a tem-
poral logic, it can still tell something about the structure of histories generated in a
given jstit model. Indeed, let us define that a jstit model M is based on discrete time
iff every chain in Hist(M) is isomorphic to an initial segment of ω, the set of natural
numbers. Then it can be shown that:
Proposition 1. The set of JA-STIT formulas valid over the class of (unirelational)
jstit models is a proper subset of the set of JA-STIT formulas valid over the class of
(unirelational) jstit models based on discrete time.
Proof. We clearly have the subset relation. As for the properness part, consider the
formula K(¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey) → (¬Ex ∨ Ey) with x, y ∈ PV ar. We show that this
formula is not valid over the class of all unirelational jstit models (hence not valid
over the class of all jstit models either). Consider the following unirelational model
M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R, E , V 〉 for the community of a single agent j:
• Tree = {a, b} ∪ {r ∈ R | 0 < r < 1};
• ✂ = {(a, b)} ∪ {(a, r) | r ∈ R ∩ Tree} ∪ {(r, r′) | r, r′ ∈ R ∩ Tree, r ≤ r′};
• Choicemj = Hm for all m ∈ Tree;
• R = ✂;
• E(m, t) = Form, for all m ∈ Tree and t ∈ Pol.
• V (p) = ∅ for all p ∈ V ar.
It is straightforward to see that the above-defined components of M satisfy all the
constraints imposed on normal jstit models except possibly those involving Act. Before
we go on and define Act, let us pause a bit and reflect on the structure of histories in
the model M that is being defined. We only have two histories in it, one is h1 = (a, b)
and the other is h2 = {a} ∪ {r ∈ R | 0 < r < 1}. So we define:
• Act(a, h2) = {x};
• Act(a, h1) = Act(b, h1) = ∅;
• Act(r, h2) = {x, y} for all r ∈ R ∩ Tree.
Again, most of the constraints on jstit models are now easily seen to be satisfied.3 The
no new proofs guaranteed constraint is perhaps less straightforward, so we consider it
in some detail. We have, on the one hand, Act(a, h1) ∩ Act(a, h2) = Act(b, h1) = ∅,
so neither a, nor b can falsify the constraint. The only remaining option is that
m ∈ {r ∈ R | 0 < r < 1}, say m = r. But then the only history passing through
r is h2 and we have, on the other hand,
r
2 ∈ Tree,
r
2 < r, and Act(
r
2 , h2) = Act(r, h2)
so that the no new proofs guaranteed constraint is again verified.
3Note that this model also satisfies any possible constant specification (as defined in Section 5) so
that introducing any such specification cannot affect the counterexample at hand.
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Now, consider a ∈ Tree. The set of a’s epistemic alternatives is Tree itself. We
have M, a, h1 6|= Ex, therefore M, a, h2 |= ¬✷Ex, whence M, a, h2 |= ¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey.
We also have, of course, that M, a, h1 |= ¬✷Ex and M, a, h1 |= ¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey. In the
same way, we see that M, b, h1 |= ¬✷Ex and M, b, h1 |= ¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey
Moreover, if r is a real number strictly between 0 and 1, then M, r, h2 |= Ex, and,
since h2 is the only history passing through r, we get alsoM, r, h2 |= ✷Ex, and, further,
M, r, h2 |= ¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey. Thus the formula ¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey holds at every epistemic
alternative of a for every history passing through this alternative. This means that
M, a, h2 |= K(¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey). Besides, we have that M, a, h2 |= Ex ∧ ¬Ey, so that
the pair (a, h2) falsifies the formula K(¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey)→ (¬Ex ∨Ey) in M.
On the other hand, K(¬✷Ex∨✷Ey)→ (¬Ex∨Ey) is valid in the class of jstit mod-
els based on discrete time (hence also over unirelational jstit models based on discrete
time). In order to show this, we will assume its invalidity and obtain a contradiction.
Indeed, let M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉 be a jstit model based on discrete
time such that
M,m, h 6|= K(¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey)→ (¬Ex ∨ Ey).
Then we will have both
M,m, h |= K(¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey), (1)
and
M,m, h |= Ex ∧ ¬Ey. (2)
By (1), we know that:
M,m, h |= ¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey, (3)
and, by (2), it follows that:
M,m, h |= ¬✷Ey. (4)
Therefore, we know by (3) that M,m, h |= ¬✷Ex, so that there is an h′ ∈ Hm such
that M,m, h′ |= ¬Ex. In view of (2), we must have h 6= h′, so Hm cannot be a
singleton. Since histories are defined as maximal chains of moments, we know that
Hm′ is always a singleton when m
′ ∈ Tree is ✂-maximal. Therefore m cannot be
✂-maximal and thus m cannot be the ✂-last moment along h. Since M is based on
discrete time, consider embedding f of h into an initial segment of ω. Suppose that
f(m) = n. Since m is not the ✂-last moment along h, there must be an m′ ∈ h such
that f(m′) = n + 1. Since f is an embedding, this means that m ✁ m′ and for no
m′′ ∈ Tree it is true that m✁m′′ ✁m′. By the future always matters constraint, we
know that R(m,m′), therefore, by (1) we must have:
M,m′, h |= ¬✷Ex ∨ ✷Ey. (5)
On the other hand, let g ∈ Hm′ be arbitrary. Then, by the absence of backward branch-
ing, g ∈ Hm, and, moreover, g is undivided from h at m. Therefore, by the presenting
a new proof makes histories divide constraint, we must have Act(m, g) = Act(m,h).
By (2) we know that x ∈ Act(m,h), which means that also x ∈ Act(m, g). Since
g ∈ Hm′ was chosen arbitrarily, the latter means that x ∈
⋂
g∈H
m′
(Act(m, g)), and, by
the expansion of presented proofs constraint, x ∈
⋂
g∈H
m′
(Act(m′, g)). This, in turn,
yields that:
M,m′, h |= ✷Ex, (6)
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whence, in view of (5), it follows that
M,m′, h |= ✷Ey. (7)
The latter means that y ∈
⋂
g∈H
m′
(Act(m′, g)), and by the no new proofs guaranteed
constraint, it follows that for some g ∈ Hm′ and some m
′′ ∈ g such that m′′ ✁ m′,
we must have y ∈ Act(m′′, g). Now, if m′′ ✁ m′ it follows that m′′ ✂ m, since m′
was chosen as the immediate ✁-successor of m along h. The latter means, by the
expansion of presented proofs, that y ∈ Act(m, g). Since g is undivided from h at
m, this means, by the presenting a new proof makes histories divide constraint, that
Act(m, g) = Act(m,h) and, further, that y ∈ Act(m,h). The latter is in obvious
contradiction with (2).
Proposition 1 shows that if one wants to prove the completeness theorem for JA-
STIT by constructing a canonical model, the histories in this model both have to be
allowed to be infinite and have to have a rather involved order structure. This shows
that the canonical model used in the completeness proof that follows below, is not
likely to allow for any major simplifications.
3 Axiomatic system and soundness
We consider the Hilbert-style axiomatic system Σ with the following set of axiomatic
schemes:
A full set of axioms for classical propositional logic (A0)
S5 axioms for ✷ and [j] for every j ∈ Agent (A1)
✷A→ [j]A for every j ∈ Agent (A2)
(✸[j1]A1 ∧ . . . ∧✸[jn]An)→ ✸([j1]A1 ∧ . . . ∧ [jn]An) (A3)
(s:(A→ B)→ (t:A→ (s× t):B) (A4)
t:A→ (!t:(t:A) ∧KA) (A5)
(s:A ∨ t:A)→ (s+ t):A (A6)
S4 axioms for K (A7)
KA→ ✷K✷A (A8)
✷Et→ K✷Et (A9)
The assumption is that in (A3) j1, . . . , jn are pairwise different.
To this set of axiom schemes we add the following rules of inference:
From A,A→ B infer B; (R1)
From A infer KA; (R2)
If A is an instance of (A0)–(A9) and c ∈ PConst, then infer c:A; (R3)
From KA→ (¬✷Et1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬✷Etn)
infer KA→ (¬Et1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬Etn). (R4)
Rule (R3) is obviously not satisfied over the general class of jstit models. However, we
introduce it as an inheritance of justification logic with its constant specifications. Rule
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(R3) gives just one example of such constant specification, but it serves as a general case
in our situation, since the form of our completeness proof allows for a straightforward
adaptation to any other variant of constant specification allowed for in justification
logic, including the empty constant specification which would correspond to omitting
(R3) altogether. On the other hand, should we take the empty constant specification
as our default example, it would not be clear how to adapt the proof to accommodate
non-empty constant specification, since completeness proof for the empty specification
allows for quite a bit of shortcuts, which are not available in the more general case. We
postpone a more general discussion of constant specifications till Section 5, confining
ourselves in the meantime to the particular case given by (R3).
In order to adapt the scope of our completeness result to the presence of (R3), we
call a (unirelational) jstit model M normal iff the following condition is satisfied:
(∀c ∈ PConst)(∀m ∈ Tree)({A | A is a substitution case of
a scheme in (A1)–(A9)} ⊆ E(m, c)).
Our goal is now to obtain a strong completeness theorem for Σ w.r.t. the class of
normal models. Establishing soundness mostly reduces to a routine check that every
axiom is valid and that rules preserve validity. We treat the less obvious cases in some
detail:
Theorem 1. Every instance of (A0)–(A9) is valid over the class of normal jstit models.
Every application of rules (R1)–(R4) to formulas which are valid over the class of
normal jstit models yields a formula which is valid over the class of normal jstit models.
Proof. First, note that if M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉 is a normal jstit
model, then 〈Tree,✂, Choice, V 〉 is a model of stit logic. Therefore, axioms (A0)–(A3),
which were copy-pasted from the standard axiomatization of dstit logic4 must be valid.
Second, note that if M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉 is a normal jstit model,
then M = 〈Tree,R,Re, E , V 〉 is what is called in [2, Section 6] a justification model
with the form of constant specification defined by (R3)5. This means that also all of
the (A4)–(A7) must be valid, whereas (R1)–(R3) must preserve validity, given that all
these parts of our axiomatic system were borrowed from the standard axiomatization
of justification logic . The validity of other parts of Σ will be motivated below in some
detail. In what follows, M = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R,Re, E , V 〉 will always stand for
an arbitrary normal jstit model, and (m,h) for an arbitrary element of MH(M).
As for (A8), assume for reductio thatM,m, h |= KA∧✸K✸¬A. ThenM,m, h |= KA
and also M,m, h′ |= K✸¬A for some h′ ∈ Hm. By reflexivity of R, it follows that
✸¬A will be satisfied at (m,h) in M. The latter means that, for some h′′ ∈ Hm, A
must fail at (m,h′′) and therefore, again by reflexivity of R, KA must fail at (m,h) in
M, a contradiction.
We consider next (A9). If ✷Et is true at (m,h) in M, then, by definition,
t ∈
⋂
h∈Hm
Act(m,h). Now, if m′ ∈ Tree is such that R(m,m′), then, by epistemic
transparency of presented proofs constraint, we must have t ∈
⋂
h′∈H
m′
Act(m′, h′)
so that for every g ∈ Hm′ we will have M,m′, g |= ✷Et. Therefore, we must have
M,m, h |= K✷Et as well.
4See, e.g. [4, Ch. 17], although Σ uses a simpler format closer to that given in [3, Section 2.3].
5The format for the variable assignment V is slightly different, but this is of no consequence for
the present setting.
12 Grigory. K. Olkhovikov
It only remains to show that (R4) preserves validity over normal jstit models. As-
sume that KA→ (¬✷Et1∨ . . .∨¬✷Etn) is valid over normal jstit models, and assume
also that we have:
M,m, h |= KA ∧ Et1 ∧ . . . ∧ Etn. (8)
Whence, by the assumed validity, we know that also:
M,m, h |= ¬✷Et1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬✷Etn,
therefore, we can choose a natural k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ n and M,m, h |= ¬✷Etk. The
latter, in turn, means that for some h′ ∈ Hm we have that:
M,m, h′ |= ¬Etk. (9)
Comparison between (8) and (9) shows that h 6= h′. Therefore, we know that Hm is
not a singleton, which means that m cannot be a ✂-maximal moment in Tree and
we can choose an m′ ∈ Tree such that h ∈ Hm′ and m′ ✄m. By (8) we know that
t1, . . . , tn ∈ Act(m,h) and we know that every g ∈ Hm′ is undivided from h at m.
Therefore, by the presenting a new proof makes histories divide constraint, we get that
t1, . . . , tn ∈ Act(m, g) for all g ∈ Hm′ , hence, by the expansion of presented proofs
constraint, we get that t1, . . . , tn ∈
⋂
g∈H
m′
Act(m′, g). This means that we have, on
the one hand:
M,m′, h |= ✷Et1 ∧ . . . ∧ ✷Etn. (10)
And, on the other, hand, we know that by the future always matters constraint, we
have R(m,m′), which also means that, by (8) we get that:
M,m′, h |= KA. (11)
Taken together, (10) and (11) contradict the validity ofKA→ (¬✷Et1∨, . . . ,∨¬✷Etn).
We then define a proof in Σ as a finite sequence of formulas such that every formula
in it is either an axiom or is obtained from earlier elements of the sequence by one of
inference rules. A proof is a proof of its last formula. If an A ∈ Form is provable
in our system, we will write ⊢Σ A. However, since we will not be considering any
axiomatic systems different from Σ until Section 5, the subscript to ⊢ will be suppressed.
Similarly, we will simply speak of consistency and inconsistency meaning consistency
and inconsistency relative to Σ.
The presence of (R4) in Σ complicates the issue of finding the right notion of an
inference from premises and the right format for Deduction Theorem. Therefore, we
cannot just define that a set Γ ⊆ Form is inconsistent iff ⊥ is derivable from Γ.
We have to take a little detour and say that Γ ⊆ Form is inconsistent iff for some
A1, . . . , An ∈ Γ we have ⊢ (A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An) → ⊥, and we say that Γ is consistent iff it
is not inconsistent. Γ is maxiconsistent iff it is consistent and no consistent subset of
Form properly extends Γ.
Even with this slightly non-standard definition of inconsistency, we can still do
many familiar things, e.g. extend consistent sets with new formulas and eventually
make them maxiconsistent. More precisely, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 1. Let Γ ⊆ Form be consistent, and let A,B ∈ Form. Then:
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1. There exists a ∆ ⊆ Form such that ∆ is maxiconsistent and Γ ⊆ ∆.
2. If Γ is maxiconsistent, then exactly one element of {A,¬A} is in Γ.
3. If Γ is maxiconsistent, then A ∨B ∈ Γ iff (A ∈ Γ or B ∈ Γ).
4. If Γ is maxiconsistent and A, (A→ B) ∈ Γ, then B ∈ Γ.
5. If Γ is maxiconsistent, then A ∧B ∈ Γ iff (A ∈ Γ and B ∈ Γ).
Proof. (Part 1) Just as in the standard case, we enumerate the elements of Form as
A1, . . . , An, . . . and form the sequence of sets Γ1, . . . ,Γn, . . . , such that Γ1 := Γ and for
every natural i ≥ 1:
Γi+1 :=
{
Γi, if Γi ∪ {Ai} is inconsistent;
Γi ∪ {Ai}, otherwise.
We now define ∆ :=
⋃
i≥1 Γi. Of course, we have Γ ⊆ ∆, and, moreover, ∆ is maxicon-
sistent. To see this, note that for every i ≥ 1 the set Γi is consistent by construction.
Now, if ∆ is inconsistent, then there must be a valid implication from a finite conjunc-
tion of formulas in ∆ to ⊥. These formulas must be mentioned in our numeration of
Form so that the valid implication in question can presented as ⊢ (Ai1 ∧. . .∧Ain)→ ⊥
for appropriate natural i1, . . . , in. Since all of Ai1 , . . . , Ain are in ∆, we must have, by
the construction of Γ1, . . . ,Γn, . . . , that Ai1 , . . . , Ain ∈ Γmax(i1,...,in). But then this
latter set must be inconsistent which contradicts our construction.
Further, if some consistent Ξ ⊆ Form is such that ∆ ⊂ Ξ, then let An ∈ Ξ \ ∆.
We must have then Γn ∪ {An} inconsistent, but we also have Γn ∪ {An} ⊆ Ξ, which
implies inconsistency of Ξ, in contradiction to our assumptions. Therefore, ∆ is not
only consistent, but also maxiconsistent.
(Part 2)We cannot have both A and ¬A in Γ, since we have, of course, ⊢ (A∧¬A)→ ⊥.
If, on the other hand, neither A, nor ¬A is in Γ, then both Γ∪{A} and Γ∪{¬A} must
be inconsistent, so that for some B1, . . . , Bn ∈ Γ we will have:
⊢ (B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bn ∧A)→ ⊥,
whereas for some C1, . . . , Ck ∈ Γ we will have:
⊢ (C1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ck ∧ ¬A)→ ⊥,
whence we get, using (A0) and (R1):
⊢ (C1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ck)→ A,
and further:
⊢ (B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bn ∧C1 ∧ . . . ∧Ck)→ ⊥,
so that Γ turns out to be inconsistent, contrary to our assumptions.
(Part 3) Assume (A ∨ B) ∈ Γ. If neither A nor B are in Γ, then, by Part 2, both
¬A and ¬B are in Γ. Using (A0) and (R1) we get that:
⊢ ((A ∨B) ∧ ¬A ∧ ¬B)→ ⊥,
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showing that Γ is inconsistent, contrary to our assumptions. In the other direction, if,
say A ∈ Γ and (A ∨B) /∈ Γ, then, by Part 2, we must have ¬(A ∨B) ∈ Γ. Using (A0)
and (R1) we get that:
⊢ (¬(A ∨B) ∧A)→ ⊥,
showing, again, that Γ is inconsistent, contrary to our assumptions. The case when
B ∈ Γ is similar.
Parts 4 and 5 are similar to Part 3.
We are now prepared to formulate our main result:
Theorem 2. Let Γ ⊆ Form. Then Γ is consistent iff it is satisfiable in a normal
(unirelational) jstit model.
The rest of the paper is mainly concerned with proving Theorem 2. One part of it
we have, of course, right away, as a consequence of Theorem 1:
Corollary 1. If Γ ⊆ Form is satisfiable in a normal (unirelational) jstit model, then
Γ is consistent.
Proof. Let Γ ⊆ Form be satisfiable in a normal jstit model so that we have, say
M,m, h |= Γ for some (m,h) ∈MH(M). If Γ were inconsistent this would mean that
for some A1, . . . , An ∈ Γ we would have ⊢ (A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An) → ⊥. By Theorem 1, this
would mean that:
M,m, h |= (A1 ∧ . . . ∧An)→ ⊥,
whence clearly M,m, h |= ⊥, which is impossible. Therefore, Γ must be consistent.
Further, if Γ ⊆ Form is satisfiable in a normal unirelational jstit model, then Γ
must be satisfiable in a normal jstit model. Hence Γ must be consistent by the above
reasoning.
Before we move further, we mention some theorems in the above axiom system to
be used later in the proof of the main result:
Lemma 2. The following holds for every A ∈ Form, t ∈ Pol, x ∈ PV ar, and j ∈ Ag:
1. ⊢ t:A→ ✷t:A;
2. ⊢ KA→ ✷KA.
Proof. (Part 1) We have:
t:A→!t:t:A (by (A5))
→ Kt:A (by (A5))
→ ✷K✷t:A (by (A8))
→ K✷t:A (by (A1))
→ ✷t:A (by (A7))
Our theorem follows then by transitivity of implication.
(Part 2). By S5 properties of ✷ and S4 properties of K, we clearly have
⊢ ✷K✷A→ ✷KA. Part 2 follows then by (A8) and transitivity of implication.
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4 The canonical model
The main aim of the present section is to prove the inverse of Corollary 1. The
method used is a variant of the canonical model technique, but, due to the complexity
of the case, we do not define our model in one full sweep. Rather, we proceed piecewise,
defining elements of the model one by one, and checking the relevant constraints as
soon, as we have got enough parts of the model in place. The last subsection proves
the truth lemma for the defined model. As we have already indicated, the model to
be built will be a normal unirelational jstit model, so that Re will be omitted, or,
equivalently, assumed to coincide with R.
The ultimate building blocks of M we will call elements. Before going on with the
definition ofM, we define what these elements are and explore some of their properties.
Definition 1. An element is a sequence of the form (Γ1, . . . ,Γn) for some n ∈ ω with
n ≥ 1 such that:
• For every k ≤ n, Γk is maxiconsistent;
• For every k < n, for all A ∈ Form, if KA ∈ Γk, then KA ∈ Γk+1;
• For every k < n, for all t ∈ Pol, if Et ∈ Γk, then ✷Et ∈ Γk+1.
We prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Whenever (Γ1, . . . ,Γn) is an element, there exists a Γn+1 ⊆ Form such
that the sequence (Γ1, . . . ,Γn+1) is also an element.
Proof. Assume (Γ1, . . . ,Γn) is an element and consider the following set:
∆ := {KA | KA ∈ Γn} ∪ {✷Et | Et ∈ Γn}.
We show that ∆ is consistent. Of course, the set {KA | KA ∈ Γn} is consistent
since it is a subset of Γn and the latter is assumed to be consistent. Further, if ∆ is
inconsistent, then, wlog, for some KB1, . . . ,KBr, Et1, . . . , Etu ∈ Γn we will have:
⊢ (KB1 ∧ . . . ∧KBr)→ (¬✷Et1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬✷Etu),
whence, by (A7):
⊢ K(B1 ∧ . . . ∧Br)→ (¬✷Et1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬✷Etu),
and further, by (R4):
⊢ K(B1 ∧ . . . ∧Br)→ (¬Et1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬Etu).
The latter formula shows that Γn is inconsistent which contradicts the assumption that
(Γ1, . . . ,Γn) is an element.
Therefore, ∆ must be consistent, and, by Lemma 1.1, it is also extendable to a
maxiconsistent Γn+1. By the choice of ∆, this means that (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γn+1) must be
an element.
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The structure of elements will be important in what follows. If ξ = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn) is
an element and an element τ is of the form (Γ1, . . . ,Γk) with k < n, we say that τ is a
proper initial segment of ξ. Moreover, if k = n− 1, then τ is the greatest proper initial
segment of ξ. We define n to be the length of ξ. Furthermore, we define that Γn is the
end element of ξ and write Γn = end(ξ).
We now define the canonical model using elements as our building blocks. We start
by defining the following relation ≡:
(Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γn+1) ≡ (∆1, . . . ,∆n,∆n+1)⇔ (Γ1 = ∆1& . . .&Γn = ∆n&
&(∀A ∈ Form)(✷A ∈ Γn+1 ⇒ A ∈ ∆n+1).
It is routine to check that ≡ is an equivalence relation given that ✷ is an S5 modal-
ity. The notation [(Γ1, . . . ,Γn)]≡ will denote the ≡-equivalence class generated by
(Γ1, . . . ,Γn). Since all the elements inside a given ≡-equvalence class are of the same
length, we may extend the notion of length to these classes setting that the length of
[(Γ1, . . . ,Γn)]≡ also equals n.
We now proceed to definitions of components for the canonical model.
4.1 Tree, ≤, and Hist(M)
The first two elements of the canonical model M are as follows:
• Tree = {†} ∪ {([ξ]≡, n) | n ∈ ω, ξ is an element}. Thus the elements of Tree,
with the exception of the special moment †, are ≡-equivalence classes of elements
coupled with natural numbers. Such moments we will call standard moments,
and the left projection of a standard moment m we will call its core (and write
−→m), while the right projection of such moment we will call its height (and write
|m|). In this way, we get the equality m = (−→m, |m|) for every standard m ∈ Tree.
We further define that the length of a standard moment m is the length of its
core. For the sake of completeness, we extend the above notions to † setting both
length and height of this moment to 0 and defining that
−→
† = †.
• We set that (∀m ∈ Tree \ {†})(†✁m&¬m✁ †). We further set that for any two
standard moments m and m′, we have that m ✁m′ iff either (1) there exists a
ξ ∈ −→m such that for every τ ∈
−→
m′, ξ is a proper initial segment of τ , or (2) −→m =
−→
m′
and |m′| < |m|. The relation ✂ is then defined as the reflexive companion to ✁.
Before we move on to the choice- and justifications-related components, let us pause
to check that the restraints imposed by our semantics on Tree and ✂ are satisfied:
Lemma 4. The relation ✂, as defined above, is a partial order on Tree, which satisfies
both historical connection and no backward branching constraints.
Proof. Reflexivity of ✂ holds by definition. For transitivity, suppose that m,m′, and
m′′ are in Tree and that we have m ✂m′ and m′ ✂m′′. Then, if any two moments
among m,m′ and m′′ coincide, or if one of those moments is †, we must clearly have
m ✂m′′. So suppose that all of m,m′ and m′′ are standard and pairwise different so
that we have m✁m′ ✁m′′. We have then four cases to consider:
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Case 1. There are ξ ∈ −→m and τ ∈
−→
m′ such that ξ is a proper initial segment of
every element in
−→
m′ (and this clearly includes τ), and τ is a proper initial segment of
every element in
−→
m′′. It is immediate then that ξ is a proper initial segment of every
element in
−→
m′′, and m✁m′′ follows.
Case 2. We have |m| > |m′| > |m′′| and also −→m =
−→
m′ =
−→
m′′. Then both |m| > |m′′|
and −→m =
−→
m′′ clearly follow so that we get m✁m′′.
Case 3. There is a ξ ∈ −→m such that ξ is a proper initial segment of every element
in
−→
m′. Additionally, we have both
−→
m′ =
−→
m′′ and |m′| > |m′′|. Then clearly ξ must be
a proper initial segment also of every element in
−→
m′′ so that m✁m′′ holds.
Case 4. There is a τ ∈
−→
m′ such that τ is a proper initial segment of every element
in
−→
m′′. On the other hand, we have both −→m =
−→
m′ and |m| > |m′|. Then, of course, τ
is also in −→m and again we get m✁m′′.
As for anti-symmetry, assume that we have both m✁m′ and m′✁m. Then both
m and m′ must be standard. Again we have to consider four cases, and we obtain a
contradiction in each of them, showing that this situation never arises:
Case 1. There are ξ ∈ −→m and (τ) ∈
−→
m′ such that ξ is a proper initial segment of
every element in
−→
m′ and τ is a proper initial segment of every element in −→m. It is clear
then that both ξ is a proper initial segment of τ and τ a proper initial segment of ξ,
which gives us the contradiction.
Case 2. We have −→m =
−→
m′ and also both |m| > |m′| and |m| < |m′|. The contradic-
tion is immediate.
Case 3. There is a ξ ∈ −→m such that ξ is a proper initial segment of every element
in
−→
m′. Besides, we have both −→m =
−→
m′ and |m′| > |m|. But then ξ ∈
−→
m′ and therefore
must be its own proper initial segment, a contradiction.
Case 4. There is a τ ∈
−→
m′ such that τ is a proper initial segment of every element
in −→m, and also we have both −→m =
−→
m′ and |m| > |m′|. This case is similar to Case 3.
Historical connection is satisfied since † is the ✂-least element of Tree.
Let us prove the absence of backward branching. Assume that we have both
m✂m′′ andm′✂m′′ but neitherm✂m′ norm′✂m holds. This means that all the three
moments are pairwise different and none of them is †, otherwise our assumptions about
them would be immediately falsified. Therefore, all the three moments are standard
and we also have m 6= m′, m ✁m′′, and m′ ✁m′′. We will use the familiar fourfold
partition of cases:
Case 1. There are ξ ∈ −→m and τ ∈
−→
m′ such that both ξ and τ are proper initial
segments of every element in
−→
m′′. If ξ = τ , then we must have −→m =
−→
m′ since moment
cores are classes of equivalence. Hence we will have |m| 6= |m′|, since m 6= m′. But
then, depending on whether we have |m| < |m′| or |m′| < |m|, we get either m′ ✁m
or m✁m′. On the other hand, if ξ is different from τ , then either ξ must be a proper
initial segment of τ or vice versa. Assume, wlog, that ξ is a proper segment of τ . Then
ξ is included in the greatest proper initial segment of τ and since every element in
−→
m′ has the same greatest proper initial segment, this means that ξ is a proper initial
segment of every element in
−→
m′ so that m✁m′.
Case 2. We have, on the one hand, −→m =
−→
m′′ and |m′′| < |m|, and, on the other
18 Grigory. K. Olkhovikov
hand
−→
m′ =
−→
m′′ and |m′′| < |m′|. Then we immediately get that −→m =
−→
m′. Further,
by m 6= m′ we know that either |m| < |m′| or |m′| < |m| whence we get, respectively,
either m′ ✁m or m✁m′.
Case 3. There is a ξ ∈ −→m such that ξ is a proper initial segment of every element in
−→
m′′, and, on the other hand, we have both
−→
m′ =
−→
m′′ and |m′′| < |m′|. Then, of course
ξ is also a proper initial segment of every element in
−→
m′, and m✁m′ follows.
Case 4. There is a τ ∈
−→
m′ such that τ is a proper initial segment of every element
in
−→
m′′, and, on the other hand, we have both −→m =
−→
m′′ and |m′′| < |m|. This case is
similar to Case 3.
Before we move on to the other components of the canonical modelM to be defined
in this section, we look into the structure of Hist(M) as induced by the above-defined
Tree and ✂. We start by defining a basic sequence of elements. A basic sequence of
elements is a set of elements of the form {ξ1, . . . , ξn, . . . , } such that for every n ≥ 1:
• ξn is of length n;
• ξn is the greatest proper initial segment of ξn+1.
Basic sequences will be denoted by capital Latin letters S, T , and U with subscripts
and superscripts when needed. Every given basic sequence S induces the following
[S] ⊆ Tree:
[S] = {†} ∪
⋃
n∈ω
{([ξn]≡, k) | k ∈ ω}.
It is immediate that every basic sequence S induces a unique [S] ⊆ Tree in this way.
It is, perhaps, less immediate that the mapping S 7→ [S] is injective:
Lemma 5. Let S, T be basic sequences of elements. Then:
[S] = [T ]⇒ S = T.
Proof. Assume that S = {ξ1, . . . , ξn, . . . , } and that T = {τ1, . . . , τn, . . . , }. We will
show that ξn = τn for arbitrary n ∈ ω. Indeed, note that it is immediate from the
definition of S 7→ [S], that both [S] and [T ] contain exactly one moment of length
n + 1 and height 0, and these moments are ([ξn+1]≡, 0) and ([τn+1]≡, 0), respectively.
Therefore, if [S] = [T ], then we must have ([ξn+1]≡, 0) = ([τn+1]≡, 0), whence, further,
[ξn+1]≡ = [τn+1]≡ and ξn+1 ≡ τn+1. Therefore, ξn+1 and τn+1 must share the greatest
proper initial segment which is ξn for ξn+1 and τn for τn+1. Since this segment is the
same for ξn+1 and τn+1, it follows that ξn = τn.
We now move on to a characterization of Hist(M), first proving a number of
technical lemmas:
Lemma 6. If h ∈ Hist(M) and k ∈ ω, then h contains at least one moment of length
exceeding k.
Proof. Suppose otherwise, and let k ∈ ω be such that every moment in h has length
at most k. We may assume that this is the least such k so that some elements of the
length k are actually in h. We have to consider two cases then:
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Case 1. k = 0. Then h = {†}. Take any maxiconsistent Γ ⊆ Form, it is immediate
that (Γ) is an element. Then ([(Γ)]≡, 0) ∈ Tree and, moreover † ✁ ([(Γ)]≡, 0), so that
{†, ([(Γ)]≡, 0)} is a ✂-chain properly extending h, which contradicts the maximality of
h.
Case 2. k > 0. Then take an arbitrary moment m of the length k in h, say
m = ([(Γ1, . . . ,Γk)]≡, n). Then ([(Γ1, . . . ,Γk)]≡, 0) is an ✂-upper bound for h. Indeed,
we clearly have m✂ ([(Γ1, . . . ,Γk)]≡, 0). Now, if m
′ ∈ h, then either m′✂m, or m✁m′.
If m′ ✂m, then, by transitivity, m′ ✂ ([(Γ1, . . . ,Γk)]≡, 0) and we are done. If m✁m
′,
then we cannot have any ξ ∈ −→m such that ξ is a proper initial segment of every element
in
−→
m′ since every such ξ is of length k and this would mean that elements in
−→
m′ must
have a length greater than k, which contradicts the choice of m′. Therefore, we must
have −→m =
−→
m′ and also |m′| < |m|. But then also m′ ✂ ([(Γ1, . . . ,Γk)]≡, 0) clearly
follows.
Now, using Lemma 3, we can choose a Γk+1 ⊆ Form such that (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,Γk+1)
is an element. Consider then m′′ = ([(Γ1, . . . ,Γk,Γk+1)]≡, 0) ∈ Tree. We obviously
have m′′ /∈ h since the length of m′′ is k+1. On the other hand, we have, by definition
of ✂, that ([(Γ1, . . . ,Γk)]≡, 0)✁m
′′. Hence h ∪ {m′′} is a ✂-chain properly extending
h, which, again, contradicts the maximality of h.
Lemma 7. If h ∈ Hist(M) and k ∈ ω, then h contains at least one moment of the
length k.
Proof. Take an arbitrary k ∈ ω. If k = 0, then the lemma holds, since †, being the
✂-least moment in Tree, is of course in h. Assume that k > 0. There are two cases to
consider then.
Case 1. For every n+1 ∈ ω it is true that whenever there is a moment of the length
n+1 in h, then there is also a moment of length n in h. Then our lemma follows from
Lemma 6.
Case 2. There is an n + 1 ∈ ω such that some m ∈ Tree of the length n + 1
is in h, but there are no moments of the length n in h. Then consider m, say
m = ([(Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γn+1)]≡, r). We show then that m
′ = ([(Γ1, . . . ,Γn)]≡, 0) must
be in h as well, since h∪{m′} is a ✂-chain and h is maximal. Indeed, we have m′✁m,
since (Γ1, . . . ,Γn) is a proper initial segment of every element in
−→m. Now, if m′′ ∈ h,
then either m ✂m′′, or m′′ ✁m. If m ✂m′′, then of course m′ ✁m′′ by transitivity.
If, on the other hand, m′′ ✁ m, then, by the absence of backward branching, either
m′′ ✂m′ or m′ ✂m.
Thus we have shown that m′ ∈ h, and since the length of m′ equals n, this gives us
a contradiction with the hypothesis of Case 2.
Lemma 8. Assume that h ∈ Hist(M), that k ∈ ω, and that m,m′ ∈ h are of the
length k. Then −→m =
−→
m′.
Proof. We may assume that k > 0 since there is only one core of length 0. If m,m′ ∈ h
are standard moments, then either m ✂m′ or m′ ✂m. Assume, wlog, that m ✂m′.
Then there is no ξ ∈ −→m such that ξ is a proper initial segment of every element in
−→
m′,
since the length of ξ is equal to the length of elements in
−→
m′. Therefore, we must have
−→m =
−→
m′ by definition of ✂.
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We now offer the following characterization of Hist(M):
Lemma 9. The following statements hold:
1. If S = {ξ1, . . . , ξn, . . . , } is a basic sequence, then [S] ∈ Hist(M), and the follow-
ing presentation gives [S] in the ✂-ascending order:
†, . . . , ([ξ1]≡, k), . . . , ([ξ1]≡, 0), . . . , ([ξn]≡, k), . . . , ([ξn]≡, 0), . . . ,
2. Hist(M) = {[S] | S is a basic sequence}.
Proof. (Part 1). It is quite easy to see that for a given basic sequence S = {ξ1, . . . , ξn, . . . , },
[S] is a ✂-chain and that Part 1 of the Lemma represents this chain in the ascending
order. We focus on maximality of [S] as a ✂-chain. Suppose m ∈ Tree is such that
m /∈ [S], but [S] ∪ {m} is still a ✂-chain. Then m must be standard, since † is al-
ready in [S]. Suppose m = ([τ ]≡, k) for some element τ and k ∈ ω, and suppose that
the length of m is n ≥ 1. Consider then ([ξn+1]≡, 0) ∈ [S]. Since [S] ∪ {m} is a
✂-chain we must have either ([ξn+1]≡, 0) ✂ m or m ✁ [ξn+1]≡, 0). But the length of
([ξn+1]≡, 0) is greater than the length of m, therefore [ξn+1]≡ 6=
−→m and also no element
in [ξn+1]≡ can be a proper initial segment of any element in
−→m. Therefore, we cannot
have ([ξn+1]≡, 0)✂m and must then get m✁ ([ξn+1]≡, 0). Given that we have shown
[ξn+1]≡ 6=
−→m, m✁ ([ξn+1]≡, 0) must mean that some element τ ∈
−→m is a proper initial
segment of every element in ([ξn+1]≡ including ξn+1. Since the length of ξn+1 is n+ 1
and the length of m is n, this means that τ ′ must be the greatest proper initial segment
of ξn+1. But the greatest proper initial segment of ξn+1 is ξn, therefore τ
′ = ξn and,
consequently, m = ([τ ]≡, k) = ([ξn]≡, k) ∈ [S], which contradicts the choice of m.
(Part 2). It follows from Part 1 that Hist(M) ⊇ {[S] | S is a basic sequence}, so
we only need to show the inverse inclusion. So, choose an arbitrary h ∈ Hist(M).
Consider the set
core(h) = {−→m | m ∈ h}.
It follows from Lemmas 7 and 8 that core(h) contains exactly one moment core of the
length n for every n ∈ ω. Therefore, core(h) has the form {†, α1, . . . , αn, . . . , }, where
every αk is an equivalence class of elements of length k. We now claim that if k ≥ 2,
then there is a ξk−1 ∈ αk−1 such that ξk−1 is a proper initial segment of every element
in αk. Indeed, we know that for some r, r
′ ∈ ω the moments (αk−1, r), (αk , r′) are in
h. We cannot have (αk, r
′) ✂ (αk−1, r) since the length of αk−1 is strictly less than
the length of αk. Therefore, since h is a chain, we must have (αk−1, r)✁ (αk, r
′), and,
again by length considerations, there must be a ξk−1 ∈ αk−1 such that ξk−1 is a proper
initial segment of every element in αk.
So we choose such a ξk−1 ∈ αk−1 for every k ≥ 2. In this way we obtain the
sequence S = {ξ1, . . . , ξn, . . . , } with the following properties:
1. For all k ≥ 1, ξk ∈ αk (so that αk = [ξk]≡ and ξk itself is therefore of the length
k);
2. For all k ≥ 1, ξk is a proper initial segment of every element in αk+1.
Now, for given k ≥ 1, since ξk is a proper initial segment of every element in αk+1,
then ξk is also a proper initial segment of ξk+1. And since the lengths of ξk and ξk+1
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are k and k + 1, respectively, then ξk is the greatest proper initial segment of ξk+1.
This means that the sequence S = {ξ1, . . . , ξn, . . . , } is in fact a basic sequence. We
now show that [S] ⊆ h and since, by Part 1, [S] is itself a history, this will mean that
[S] = h, and that, given that h was chosen arbitrarily, we will be done.
Indeed, assume that m ∈ [S]. If m = †, then of course m ∈ h by maximality of
h, since † is the ✂-least element in Tree. Therefore, assume that m is standard, say
m = ([ξn]≡, k). Take an arbitrary m
′ ∈ h. We will show that we either have m ✂m′
or m′ ✂m. In the case when m′ = † we trivially get m′ ✁m so we assume that m′ is
standard so that for some appropriate k′, n′ ∈ ω we must have m′ = ([ξn′ ]≡, k
′). We
have then three cases to consider:
Case 1. n′ < n. Then ξn′ must be a proper initial segment of every element in
[ξn]≡, and we immediately get m
′ ✁m.
Case 2. n < n′. This case is an inversion of Case 1, giving us that m✁m′.
Case 3. n = n′. Then −→m =
−→
m′ and, depending on whether we have k < k′, k′ < k,
or k = k′ we obtain that m′ ✁m, m✁m′, or m = m′, respectively.
Thus we have shown that h∪{m} is an ✂-chain, whence, by the maximality of h, it
follows that m ∈ h. And since m ∈ [S] was chosen arbitrarily, this means that [S] ⊆ h
and therefore [S] = h, as desired.
It follows from Lemmas 9 and 5 that not only every basic sequence generates a
unique h ∈ Hist(M), but also for every h ∈ Hist(M) there exists a unique basic
sequence S such that h = [S]. We will denote this unique S for a given h by ]h[. It is
immediate from Lemmas 9 and 5 that for every h ∈ Hist(M), h = [(]h[)]. Likewise, for
every basic sequence S, we have S =]([S])[. As a further useful piece of notation, we
introduce the notion of intersection of a standard moment m with a history h ∈ Hm.
Assume that m is of the length n and that ]h[= {ξ1, . . . , ξn, . . . , }. Then m must be of
the form ([ξn]≡, k) for some k ∈ ω, and we will also have
−→m∩]h[= {ξn}. We now define
the only member of the latter singleton as the result m⊓h of the intersection of m and
h, setting m ⊓ h = ξn. It can be shown that for any element ξ in the core of a given
standard moment m there exists an h ∈ Hm such that ξ = m ⊓ h:
Lemma 10. Let (Γ1, . . . ,Γk) be an element. Then, for every n ∈ ω there is at least
one history h ∈ H([(Γ1,...,Γk)]≡,n) such that ([(Γ1, . . . ,Γk)]≡, n) ⊓ h = (Γ1, . . . ,Γk).
Proof. Using Lemma 3 and axiom of choice, we successively choose Γk+1, . . . ,Γk+l, . . . ,⊆ Form
such that all of the structures
(Γ1, . . . ,Γk,Γk+1), . . . , (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,Γk+1, . . . ,Γk+l), . . . ,
are elements. But then, it is obvious that the set:
S = {(Γ1), . . . , (Γ1, . . . ,Γk), (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,Γk+1), . . . , (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,Γk+1, . . . ,Γk+l), . . . , }
is a basic sequence and [(Γ1, . . . ,Γk)]≡, n) ∈ [S] so that [S] ∈ H([(Γ1,...,Γk)]≡,n). Further,
it is clear that [(Γ1, . . . ,Γk)]≡, n) ⊓ [S] = (Γ1, . . . ,Γk), as desired.
We offer some general remarks on what we have shown thus far. Lemma 9 shows
that every history in the canonical model has a uniform order structure which can be
otherwise described as follows. If L and L′ are two linear orders then let L ⊕ L′ be a
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copy of L with a copy of L′ appended at the end, let L⊗L′ be the result of replacement
of every element in L′ with a disjoint copy of L, and let L∗ be the inversion of L. Also,
for any n ∈ ω, let (0, . . . , n) be the first n+1 natural numbers with their natural order.
Then Lemma 9 tells us that every history in the canonical model is ordered in the
type of (0)⊕ (ω∗⊗ ω). Also, note that it follows from Lemma 9 that for every ordered
couple of natural numbers (k, n) with k > 0, every given history h contains exactly one
moment of length k and height n. Another general observation is that histories in M
can only branch off at moments of height 0, so that at moments of other heights all the
histories remain undivided. This last fact does not follow from the lemmas proved thus
far and we end this subsection with its proof, also establishing a couple of technical
facts to be used later:
Lemma 11. Let m,m′ ∈ Tree, and let h ∈ Hm. If
−→m =
−→
m′, then h ∈ Hm′ and also
m ⊓ h = m′ ⊓ h.
Proof. If h ∈ Hm, then there is an element ξ ∈
−→m =
−→
m′ such that ξ ∈]h[. For this
element we will also have ξ = m⊓h. Since ξ ∈
−→
m′, we further get thatm′ = ([ξ]≡, |m′|).
It follows, by ξ ∈]h[, that m′ ∈ [(]h[)] = h so that h ∈ Hm′ . Now, consider
−→
m′∩]h[.
We know that this set must be a singleton with m′ ⊓ h as its only element, and we
know also that {ξ} = −→m∩]h[=
−→
m′∩]h[. Therefore, m′ ⊓ h = ξ = m⊓ h and thus we are
done.
Corollary 2. If h ∈ Hm and m = (
−→m, k + 1), then for the m′ = (−→m, k) it is true that
h ∈ Hm′ .
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 11.
Corollary 3. Let m ∈ Tree be such that |m| > 0, and let h, h′ ∈ Hm. Then h and h′
are undivided at m.
Proof. Since |m| > 0, we know that m = k + 1 for some k ∈ ω. Then, by Corollary 2,
we must have h, h′ ∈ Hm′ for m′ = (
−→m, k). It remains to notice that we clearly have
m✁m′.
4.2 Choice
We now define the choice structures of our canonical model:
• Choicemj (h) = {h
′ | h′ ∈ Hm (∀A ∈ Form)([j]A ∈ end(h⊓m)⇒ A ∈ end(h′⊓m))},
if m 6= † and |m| = 0;
• Choicemj = Hm, otherwise.
Since for every j ∈ Ag, [j] is an S5-modality, Choice induces a partition on Hm for
every given m ∈ Tree. We check that the choice function verifies the relevant semantic
constraints:
Lemma 12. The tuple 〈Tree,✂, Choice〉, as defined above, verifies both independence
of agents and no choice between undivided histories constraints.
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Proof. We first tackle no choice between undivided histories. Consider a moment
m and two histories h, h′ ∈ Hm such that h and h′ are undivided atm. Since the agents’
choices are only non-vacuous at moments represented by standard moments of height
0, we may safely assume that m is such a moment. Since h and h′ are undivided at
m, this means that there is a moment m′ such that m✁m′ and m′ is shared by h and
h′. Hence we know that also m′ is standard. Suppose the length of m is n and the
length of m′ is n′. Then n < n′ since m is of height 0 and therefore has no equivalence
classes of elements of length n above itself. Therefore, h ⊓m is the initial segment of
length n of h ⊓m′, and similarly, h′ ⊓m is the initial segment of length n of h′ ⊓m′.
But both h ⊓m′ and h′ ⊓m′ are, by definition, in
−→
m′, therefore, they must share the
greatest proper initial segment. Hence, their initial segments of length n must coincide
as well, and we must have h ⊓m = h′ ⊓m, whence end(h ⊓m) = end(h′ ⊓m). Now,
if j ∈ Ag and [j]A ∈ end(h ⊓m), then, by (A1) and maxiconsistency of end(h ⊓m),
we will have also A ∈ end(h ⊓m) = end(h′ ⊓m), and thus h′ ∈ Choicemj (h), so that
Choicemj (h) = Choice
m
j (h
′) since Choice is a partition of Hm.
Consider, next, the independence of agents. Let m ∈ Tree and let f be a
function on Ag such that ∀j ∈ Ag(f(j) ∈ Choicemj ). We are going to show that in this
case
⋂
j∈Ag f(j) 6= ∅. If m is not a standard moment of height 0, then this is obvious,
since every agent will have a vacuous choice. We treat the case when m is a standard
moment of height 0. Assume that m = ([(Γ1, . . . ,Γn+1)]≡, 0). By (A1) we know that
there is a set ∆ of formulas of the form ✷A which is shared by all sets of the form
end(ξ) with ξ ∈ −→m in the sense that if ξ ∈ −→m, then ✷A ∈ end(ξ) iff ✷A ∈ ∆. By the
same axiom scheme and Lemma 10, we also know that for every j ∈ Ag there is set ∆j
of formulas of the form [j]A which is shared by all sets of the form end(ξ) such that
∃h(h ∈ f(j) ∧ ξ = m ⊓ h). More precisely:
ξ ∈ −→m ⇒ (∃h(h ∈ f(j) ∧ ξ = m ⊓ h)⇔ (∀A ∈ Form)([j]A ∈ end(ξ)⇔ [j]A ∈ ∆j)).
We now consider the set ∆ ∪
⋃
{∆j | j ∈ Ag} and show its consistency. Indeed, if
this set is inconsistent, then, wlog, we would have a provable formula of the following
form:
⊢ (✷A ∧
∧
j∈Ag
[j]Aj)→ ⊥. (12)
But then, choose for every j ∈ Ag an element ξj ∈
−→m such that
(∀A ∈ Form)([j]A ∈ end(ξj)⇔ [j]A ∈ ∆j).
This is possible, since we may simply choose an arbitrary hj ∈ f(j) and set ξj := m⊓hj .
Then we will have [j]Aj ∈ ξj for every j ∈ Ag. Next, consider Γn+1. Since
m = ([(Γ1, . . . ,Γn+1)]≡, 0) and ✷ is an S5-modality, we must have:
{✸[j]Aj ∈ Ag} ⊆ Γn+1,
whence, by Lemma 1.5: ∧
j∈Ag
✸[j]Aj ∈ Γn+1,
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and further, by (A3) and Lemma 1.4:
✸
∧
j∈Ag
[j]Aj ∈ Γn+1.
Also, by definition of ∆ and the fact that (Γ1, . . . ,Γn+1) ∈
−→m, we get successively:
✷A ∈ Γn+1,
then, by Lemma 1.5:
✷A ∧✸
∧
j∈Ag
[j]Aj ∈ Γn+1,
and finally, by the fact that ✷ is an S5-modality:
✸(✷A ∧
∧
j∈Ag
[j]Aj) ∈ Γn+1. (13)
From (12), together with (13), it follows by S5 reasoning for ✷ that ✸⊥ ∈ Γn+1, so
that, again by S5 properties of ✷ and Lemma 1.4, it follows that ⊥ ∈ Γn+1, which is
in contradiction with maxiconsistency of Γn+1.
Hence ∆ ∪
⋃
{∆j | j ∈ Ag} is consistent, and we can extend it to a maxiconsistent
Ξ. We now consider (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Ξ) and show that it is in fact an element. Indeed, if
KA ∈ Γn, then KA ∈ Γn+1 by definition of an element. But then ✷KA ∈ Γn+1 by
Lemma 2.2 and maxiconsistency of Γn+1, whence ✷KA ∈ ∆ and, therefore, ✷KA ∈ Ξ.
By (A1) and maxiconsistency of Ξ we get then KA ∈ Ξ. Similarly, if Et ∈ Γn, then
✷Et ∈ Γn+1 by definition of an element. But then ✷Et ∈ ∆ and, therefore, ✷Et ∈ Ξ.
Therefore, (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Ξ) is an element and since, moreover, ∆ ⊆ Ξ, then also
(Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Ξ) ∈
−→m so that m = ([(Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Ξ)]≡, 0). Using Lemma 10, we can
choose a g ∈ Hm such that g ⊓ m = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Ξ). We also know that for every
j ∈ Ag, there is a history hj ∈ f(j) such that hj⊓m = ξj by the choice of ξj . Therefore,
for every j ∈ Ag, Choicemj (hj) = f(j). Also, if [j]A ∈ end(ξj) = end(hj ⊓m), then
[j]A ∈ ∆j , hence [j]A ∈ Ξ = end(g ⊓m), therefore, by (A1), A ∈ end(g ⊓m). Thus
we get that g ∈
⋂
j∈Ag Choice
m
j (hj) =
⋂
j∈Ag f(j) so that the independence of agents
is verified.
4.3 R and E
We now define the justifications-related elements of our canonical model. We first
define R as follows:
• R(([(Γ1, . . . ,Γn,Γ)]≡, k),m
′)⇔
⇔ (m′ 6= †)&(∀τ ∈
−→
m′)(∀A ∈ Form)(KA ∈ Γ⇒ KA ∈ end(τ));
• R(†,m), for all m ∈ Tree.
Now, for the definition of E :
• For all t ∈ Pol: E(†, t) = {A ∈ Form |⊢ t:A};
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• For all t ∈ Pol and m 6= †:
(∀A ∈ Form)(A ∈ E(m, t)⇔ (∀ξ ∈ −→m)(t:A ∈ end(ξ))).
We start by mentioning a straightforward corollary to the above definition:
Lemma 13. For allm ∈ Tree and t ∈ Pol it is true that {A ∈ Form |⊢ t:A} ⊆ E(m, t).
Proof. This holds simply by the definition of E when m = †. If m 6= †, then, for every
ξ ∈ −→m, end(ξ) is a maxiconsistent subset of Form and must contain every provable
formula.
Note that since we know that for every instance A of one of axiom schemes in
the list (A0)–(A9), it is true that ⊢ c:A for every c ∈ PConst (by (R3)), it follows,
among other things, that the above-defined function E satisfies the additional normality
condition on jstit models.
Lemma 14. The relation R, as defined above, is a preorder on Tree, and, together
with ✂, verifies the future always matters constraint.
Proof. It is straightforward to check that R, as defined above, is a preorder on Tree,
using (A7) and (A8). Let us look into why future always matters constraint is verified
as well. Assume m ∈ Tree. If m = †, then it is connected to all the elements in
Tree by both ✂ and R, so this moment cannot falsify the constraint. Let us assume
that m 6= †, say m = ([(Γ1, . . . ,Γn)]≡, k). If m ✂m′, then m′ must be also standard.
Now, if −→m =
−→
m′ and KA ∈ Γn, then, by maxiconsistency of Γn and Lemma 2.2,
we must also have ✷KA ∈ Γn, which, by definition of ≡, means that KA ∈ end(ξ)
for every ξ ∈ −→m =
−→
m′, and thus we get that R(m,m′). The other option is that
(Γ1, . . . ,Γn) is a proper initial segment of every element in m
′, so that we may assume,
wlog, that m′ = ([(Γ1, . . . ,Γn′)]≡, k
′) for some n′ > n. But then take an arbitrary
A ∈ Form. If KA ∈ Γn, then, since (Γ1, . . . ,Γn′) is an element, KA ∈ Γn′ . Moreover,
by maxiconsistency of Γn′ and Lemma 2.2, we will have✷KA ∈ Γn′ . Now, by definition
of≡, we getKA ∈ end(τ) for any given τ ∈
−→
m′. It follows that, again, we haveR(m,m′)
as desired.
We further check that the semantical constraints for E are verified:
Lemma 15. The function E, as defined above, satisfies both monotonicity of evidence
and evidence closure properties.
Proof. We start with the monotonicity of evidence. Assume R(m,m′) and t ∈ Pol.
If m = †, then, by Lemma 13, E(m, t) = {A ∈ Form |⊢ t:A} ⊆ E(m′, t) for any
m′ ∈ Tree.
Assume, further, that m is standard. Let t ∈ Pol and A ∈ Form be such that
A ∈ E(m, t). Then, for every ξ ∈ −→m, t:A ∈ end(ξ), and, by Lemma 2.1, also
Kt:A ∈ end(ξ). Therefore, by R(m,m′), we get that, for every τ ∈
−→
m′, Kt:A ∈ end(τ),
so that, by (A7) and maxiconsistency of every end(τ), also t:A ∈ end(τ). Therefore,
A ∈ E(m′, t), as desired.
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We turn now to the closure conditions. We verify the first two conditions, and
the third one can be verified in a similar way, restricting attention to t rather than
considering both s and t. Let s, t ∈ Pol. We need to consider two cases:
Case 1. m = †. If A ∈ E(m, s), then ⊢ s:A. Therefore, by (A6), we must also have
⊢ (s+ t):A so that A ∈ E(m, s+ t). Similarly, if A ∈ E(m, t), then also A ∈ E(m, s+ t)
and the closure constraint (b) is verified. If, on the other hand, it is true that for some
A,B ∈ Form we have both A→ B ∈ E(m, s) and A ∈ E(m, t), then, again, this means
that both ⊢ s:A → B and ⊢ t:A. By (A4), it follows that ⊢ s × t:B and, therefore,
also B ∈ E(m, s× t), so that the closure condition (a) is also verified.
Case 2. m 6= †. If A ∈ Form and A ∈ E(m, s), then, for every ξ ∈ −→m, s:A ∈ end(ξ),
and, by (A6) and maxiconsistency of every end(ξ), we get that s + t:A ∈ end(ξ).
Therefore, A ∈ E(m, s+ t). Similarly, if A ∈ E(m, t), then A ∈ E(m, s+ t) as well, and
closure condition (b) is verified.
On the other hand, if A,B ∈ Form and we have both A → B ∈ E(m, s) and
A ∈ E(m, t), then, for every ξ ∈ −→m, we have t:A, s:(A → B) ∈ end(ξ). By (A4) and
maxiconsistency of every end(ξ), we get that s× t:B ∈ end(ξ), thus B ∈ E(m, s × t),
and closure condition (a) is verified.
4.4 Act and V
It only remains to define Act and V for our canonical model, and we define them
as follows:
• (m,h) ∈ V (p)⇔ p ∈ end(m ⊓ h), for all p ∈ V ar;
• Act(†, h) = ∅ for all h ∈ Hist(M);
• Act(m,h) = {t ∈ Pol | Et ∈ end(m ⊓ h)}, if m 6= †, |m| = 0 and h ∈ Hm;
• Act(m,h) = {t ∈ Pol | Et ∈
⋂
g∈Hm
end(m ⊓ g)}, if m 6= †, |m| > 0 and h ∈ Hm
We first draw some of the immediate consequences of the above definitions:
Lemma 16. Assume that m ∈ Tree \ {†} and t ∈ Pol. Then the following statements
are true:
1. Et ∈
⋂
h∈Hm
(end(m ⊓ h))⇔ t ∈
⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h));
2. If |m| > 0 and h, h′ ∈ Hm, then Act(m,h) = Act(m,h′);
3. If h, h′ ∈ Hm and m ⊓ h = m ⊓ h
′, then Act(m,h) = Act(m,h′).
Proof. (Part 1). Let g ∈ Hm be arbitrary. If Et ∈
⋂
h∈Hm
(end(m ⊓ h)), then
t ∈ Act(m, g) whatever the height of m is. Since g was chosen arbitrarily, this means
that t ∈
⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h)). In the other direction, assume that t ∈ Act(m, g). Then,
again irrespectively of the height, Et ∈ end(m⊓g). Therefore, if t ∈
⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h)),
then Et ∈
⋂
h∈Hm
(end(m ⊓ h)).
(Part 2). In the assumptions of this part, we get that:
t ∈ Act(m,h)⇔ Et ∈
⋂
g∈Hm
(end(m ⊓ g))⇔ t ∈ Act(m,h′),
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for an arbitrary t ∈ Pol.
(Part 3). We have to distinguish between two cases. If |m| = 0, then, for an
arbitrary t ∈ Pol, we get that:
t ∈ Act(m,h)⇔ Et ∈ end(m ⊓ h)⇔ Et ∈ end(m ⊓ h′)⇔ t ∈ Act(m,h′).
On the other hand, if |m| > 0, then we are done by Part 2.
We now check the remaining semantic constraints on normal jstit models:
Lemma 17. The canonical model, as defined above, satisfies the constraints as to the
expransion of presented proofs, no new proofs guaranteed, presenting a new proof makes
histories divide, and epistemic transparency of presented proofs.
Proof. We consider the expansion of presented proofs first. Let m′ ✁m and let
h ∈ Hm. If m′ = †, then we have Act(†, h) = ∅, so that the expansion of presented
proofs holds. If m′ 6= †, then m is also standard. Consider then m′ ⊓ h and m ⊓ h.
Both these elements must be in the basic sequence ]h[, therefore, one of them must be
an initial segment of another. By m′✁m we know that m′ ⊓h must be a proper initial
segment ofm⊓h. So we may assume thatm′⊓h = (Γ1, . . . ,Γk) andm⊓h = (Γ1, . . . ,Γn)
for some appropriate Γ1, . . . ,Γn ⊆ Form and n > k. Now, if t ∈ Act(m′, h), then
Et ∈ end(m′⊓h) = Γk. Then, since (Γ1, . . . ,Γn) is an element, we must have✷Et ∈ Γn.
By definition of ≡, it follows that for every ξ ∈ −→m we must have that Et ∈ end(ξ). Now,
if g ∈ Hm, then of course m⊓ g ∈
−→m. Therefore, we get that Et ∈
⋂
g∈Hm
end(m⊓ g),
whence, by Lemma 16.1, t ∈ Act(m,h) immediately follows.
We consider next the no new proofs guaranteed constraint. Let m ∈ Tree.
If m = †, then
⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h)) =
⋃
m′✁m,h∈Hm
(Act(m′, h)) = ∅ and the con-
straint is trivially satisfied. Assume that m 6= †. Then m must be of the form
([(Γ1, . . . ,Γn)]≡, k) for appropriate Γ1, . . . ,Γn ⊆ Form and k ∈ ω. Assume that
t ∈
⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h)). By Lemma 16.1, we get then that Et ∈
⋂
h∈Hm
end(m ⊓ h).
Now, consider m′ = ([(Γ1, . . . ,Γn)]≡, k + 1). We clearly have m
′ ✁ m, therefore, if
g ∈ Hm, then also g ∈ Hm′ . In the other direction, if g ∈ Hm′ , then, by Corol-
lary 2, we get g ∈ Hm, so that the fans of histories passing through m and m′
are identical. Further, we have −→m =
−→
m′, hence it follows from Lemma 11 that
g⊓m = g⊓m′, whence end(g⊓m) = end(g⊓m′) for every g ∈ Hm = Hm′ , and, further,⋂
h∈Hm
end(m ⊓ h) =
⋂
h∈H
m′
end(m′ ⊓ h). Therefore, Et ∈
⋂
h∈H
m′
end(m′ ⊓ h) and
it follows, by Lemma 16.1, that t ∈ Act(m′, h) ⊆
⋃
m′✁m,h∈Hm
(Act(m′, h)).
We turn next to the presenting a new proof makes histories divide constraint.
Consider anm,m′ ∈ Tree such thatm✁m′ and arbitrary h, h′ ∈ Hm′ . We immediately
get then that h, h′ ∈ Hm. If m = †, then the constraint is verified trivially. If m 6= †,
then we have two cases to consider:
Case 1. −→m =
−→
m′ and |m| > |m′|. Then we must have |m| > 0, and by Lemma 16.2
it follows that in this case for all h, h′ ∈ Hm we will have Act(m,h) = Act(m,h′) so
that the constraint is verified.
Case 2. There is a ξ ∈ −→m such that ξ is a proper initial segment of every τ ∈
−→
m′.
Consider then m′ ⊓ h and m′ ⊓ h′. These are elements in
−→
m′, and hence ξ is a proper
initial segment of both m′ ⊓ h and m′ ⊓ h′. It follows that m⊓ h = m⊓ h′ = ξ whence,
by Lemma 16.3, we immediately get Act(m,h) = Act(m,h′).
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It remains to check the epistemic transparency of presented proofs constraint.
Assume that m,m′ ∈ Tree are such that R(m,m′). If we have m = †, then, by
definition, we must have
⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h)) = ∅, and the constraint is verified in a
trivial way. If, on the other hand, m 6= †, then, by R(m,m′), we must also have
m′ 6= †. Assume that t ∈
⋂
h∈Hm
(Act(m,h)). Then, by Lemma 16.1, we also have
Et ∈
⋂
h∈Hm
(end(m ⊓ h)). Let h ∈ Hm be arbitrary. We claim that under these
assumptions, we must have ✷Et ∈ end(m ⊓ h). Indeed, if ✷Et /∈ end(m ⊓ h), then
consider the following set Ξ of formulas:
Ξ = {✷B | ✷B ∈ end(m ⊓ h)} ∪ {¬Et}.
We claim that Ξ is consistent. Otherwise we would have
⊢ (✷B1 ∧ . . . ∧ ✷Bn)→ Et
for some ✷B1, . . . ,✷Bn ∈ end(m ⊓ h), and the latter, by S5 reasoning for ✷, would
mean that
⊢ (✷B1 ∧ . . . ∧ ✷Bn)→ ✷Et,
whence, by Lemma 1 and maxiconsistency of end(m ⊓ h), ✷Et ∈ end(m ⊓ h) would
follow, contrary to our hypothesis. But then we can extend Ξ to a maxiconsistent
∆. Assume that m ⊓ h = (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,Γ), so that Γ = end(m ⊓ h). We show that
(Γ1, . . . ,Γk,∆) ∈
−→m. We start by showing that (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,∆) is an element. If
KB ∈ Γk, then, since (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,Γ) is an element, it follows that KB ∈ Γ. By Lemma
2.2 and maxiconsistency of Γ, we further get that ✷KB ∈ Γ, whence ✷KB ∈ ∆,
and, by (A1) and maxiconsistency of ∆, KB ∈ ∆. Similarly, if Es ∈ Γk, then
✷Es ∈ Γ and further, ✷Es ∈ ∆. Once (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,∆) is thus shown to be an ele-
ment, (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,Γ) ≡ Γ1, . . . ,Γk,∆) follows immediately just by the choice of Ξ and
the fact that ∆ extends Ξ. Therefore, (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,∆) ∈
−→m. By Lemma 10 there is a
g ∈ Hm such that m ⊓ g = (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,∆). Then ∆ = end(m ⊓ g), but we also know
that ¬Et ∈ ∆. Therefore, by maxiconsistency, Et /∈ ∆ = end(m ⊓ g). But this is in
contradiction with our assumption that Et ∈
⋂
h∈Hm
(m ⊓ h).
The obtained contradiction shows that ✷Et ∈ end(m⊓ h), and by maxiconsistency
of end(m⊓ h) and (A9), this means that also K✷Et ∈ end(m ⊓ h). It remains to note
that we have, of coursem = ([m⊓h]≡, |m|), whence by R(m,m′) we get thatK✷Et ∈ τ
for every τ ∈
−→
m′. This means, by maxiconsistency of every such τ , (A1), and (A7),
that Et ∈ τ for every τ ∈
−→
m′. Note, further, that if g ∈ Hm′ , then m′ ⊓ g ∈
−→
m′,
so that we have shown that Et ∈
⋂
g∈H
m′
(m′ ⊓ g), and hence, by Lemma 16.1, also
t ∈
⋂
g∈H
m′
(Act(m′, g)), as desired.
4.5 The truth lemma
It follows from Lemmas 4–17, that our above-defined canonical model is in fact a
normal unirelational jstit model. Now we need to supply a truth lemma:
Lemma 18. Let A ∈ Form, let m ∈ Tree \ {†} be such that |m| = 0, and let h ∈ Hm.
Then:
M,m, h |= A⇔ A ∈ end(m ⊓ h).
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Proof. As is usual, we prove the lemma by induction on the construction of A. The
basis of induction with A = p ∈ V ar we have by definition of V , whereas Boolean cases
for the induction step are trivial. We treat the modal cases:
Case 1. A = ✷B. If ✷B ∈ end(m ⊓ h), then note that for every h′ ∈ Hm we
must have m ⊓ h′ ∈ m so that m ⊓ h′ ≡ m ⊓ h. By definition of ≡ and the fact
that m ∈ Tree \ {†}, we must have then B ∈ end(m ⊓ h′) for all h′ ∈ Hm and
thus, by induction hypothesis, we obtain that M,m, h |= ✷B. If, on the other hand,
✷B /∈ end(m ⊓ h), then let m ⊓ h = (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,Γ) so that end(m ⊓ h) = Γ. Then the
set
Ξ = {✷C | ✷C ∈ Γ} ∪ {¬B}
must be consistent, since otherwise we would have
⊢ (✷C1 ∧ . . . ∧ ✷Cn)→ B
for some ✷C1, . . . ,✷Cn ∈ Γ, whence, since ✷ is an S5-modality, we would get
⊢ (✷C1 ∧ . . . ∧ ✷Cn)→ ✷B,
which would mean that ✷B ∈ Γ, contrary to our assumption. Therefore, Ξ is consistent
and we can extend Ξ to a maxiconsistent ∆ ⊆ Form. Of course, in this case B /∈ ∆.
We now show that (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,∆) is an element. Indeed, if for any C ∈ Form we
have that KC ∈ Γk, then, since (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,Γ) is an element, we will have KC ∈ Γ,
whence, by maxiconsistency of Γ and (A8), ✷KC ∈ Γ, and since every boxed formula
from Γ is also in ∆, we get that ✷KC ∈ ∆, whence KC ∈ ∆ by maxiconsistency of
∆ and S5 reasoning for ✷. Further, if we have Et ∈ Γk, for some t ∈ Pol, then, since
(Γ1, . . . ,Γk,Γ) is an element, we will have ✷Et ∈ Γ, and since every boxed formula
from Γ is also in ∆, we get that ✷Et ∈ ∆.
Once we know that (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,∆) is an element, it follows by the choice of Ξ and
∆ that (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,Γ) ≡ (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,∆). By Lemma 10, for some h′ ∈ Hm we will have
(Γ1, . . . ,Γk,∆) = m ∩ h′ and, therefore, ∆ = end(m ⊓ h′). Since B /∈ ∆, it follows, by
induction hypothesis, that M,m, h′ 6|= B, hence M,m, h 6|= ✷B as desired.
Case 2. A = [j]B for some j ∈ Ag. Then, if [j]B ∈ end(m ⊓ h), by definition of
Choice and the fact that both m 6= † and |m| = 0 we must have:
Choicemj (h) = {h
′ ∈ Hm | (∀C ∈ Form)([j]C ∈ end(h ⊓m)⇒ C ∈ end(h
′ ⊓m))}.
Therefore, if h′ ∈ Choicemj (h), then we must have that B ∈ end(h
′ ⊓m), and further,
by induction hypothesis, that M,m, h′ |= B, so that we get M,m, h |= [j]B. On the
other hand, if [j]B /∈ end(m⊓h), we again assume that m⊓h = (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,Γ) so that
end(m ⊓ h) = Γ. Then the set
Ξ = {[j]C | [j]C ∈ Γ} ∪ {¬B}
must be consistent, since otherwise we would have
⊢ ([j]C1 ∧ . . . ∧ [j]Cn)→ B
for some [j]C1, . . . , [j]Cn ∈ Γ, whence, since [j] is an S5-modality, we would get
⊢ ([j]C1 ∧ . . . ∧ [j]Cn)→ [j]B,
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which would mean that [j]B ∈ Γ, contrary to our assumption. Therefore, Ξ is consistent
and we can extend Ξ to a maxiconsistent ∆ ⊆ Form. Of course, in this case B /∈ ∆.
Arguing as in Case 1, we can show that (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,∆) is an element.
Now, if D ∈ Form is such that ✷D ∈ Γ, then, by (A2) and maxiconsistency of Γ,
we know that [j]D ∈ Γ, so that also [j]D ∈ ∆, and hence, by (A1) and maxiconsistency
of ∆, D ∈ ∆. We have thus shown that:
(∀D ∈ Form)(✷D ∈ Γ⇒ D ∈ ∆), (14)
and it follows that (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,Γ) ≡ (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,∆) by definition of ≡. By Lemma 10,
for some h′ ∈ Hm we will have (Γ1, . . . ,Γk,∆) = m⊓h′ and, therefore, ∆ = end(m⊓h′).
Also, since ∆ contains all the [j]-modalized formulas from Γ, we know that for any such
h′ we will have h′ ∈ Choicemj (h). Since B /∈ ∆, it follows, by induction hypothesis,
that M,m, h′ 6|= B, hence M,m, h 6|= [j]B as desired.
Case 3. A = KB. Assume that KB ∈ end(m ⊓ h). We clearly have then
m = ([(m ⊓ h)]≡, 0). Hence, by definition of R and the fact that m 6= † we must
have for every m′ ∈ Tree:
R(m,m′)⇒ (∀τ ∈ m′)(∀C ∈ Form)(KC ∈ end(m ∩ h)⇒ KC ∈ end(τ)).
Therefore, if R(m,m′) and h′ ∈ Hm′ is arbitrary, then, of course, (h′⊓m′) ∈ m′ so that
KB ∈ end(h′ ⊓m′), and, further, B ∈ end(h′ ⊓m′) by S4 reasoning for K. Therefore,
by induction hypothesis, we get that M,m′, h′ |= B, whence M,m, h |= KB. On the
other hand, if KB /∈ end(m ⊓ h), then consider the set
Ξ = {KC | KC ∈ end(m ⊓ h)} ∪ {¬✷B}.
This set must be consistent, since otherwise we would have
⊢ (KC1 ∧ . . . ∧KCn)→ ✷B
for some KC1, . . . ,KCn ∈ Γ, whence, since K is an S4-modality, we would get
⊢ (KC1 ∧ . . . ∧KCn)→ K✷B,
which would mean that K✷B ∈ end(m⊓h), hence, by (A1), (A7) and maxiconsistency
of end(m ⊓ h), that KB ∈ end(m ⊓ h), contrary to our assumption. Therefore, Ξ is
consistent and we can extend Ξ to a maxiconsistent ∆ ⊆ Form. Of course, in this case
✷B /∈ ∆. We will have then that (∆) is an element. So we setm′ = ([(∆)]≡, 0). Assume
that (∆′) ≡ (∆). Then every boxed formula from ∆ will be in ∆′. In particular,
whenever KC ∈ ∆, then also ✷KC ∈ ∆ and thus KC ∈ ∆′, by (A1), (A8), and
maxiconsistency of ∆. Therefore, whenever KC ∈ end(m ⊓ h) and τ ∈
−→
m′ = [(∆)]≡,
we have that KC ∈ end(τ) so that we must have R(m,m′). On the other hand, since
✷B /∈ ∆, then, by Case 1, there must be a τ ∈ m′ such that B /∈ end(τ). But then,
by Lemma 10, we can choose an h′ ∈ Hm′ in such a way that τ = m′ ⊓ h′, and we get
that B /∈ end(m′ ∩ h′). Therefore, by induction hypothesis, we get M,m′, h′ 6|= B. In
view of the fact that also R(m,m′), this means that M,m, h 6|= KB as desired.
Case 4. A = t:B for some t ∈ Pol. If t:B ∈ end(m ⊓ h), then, by maxiconsistency
of end(m ⊓ h) and Lemma 2.1, we must have ✷t:B ∈ end(m ⊓ h). Now, if ξ ∈ −→m,
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then we must have, of course ξ ≡ m ⊓ h, whence t:B ∈ end(ξ). Therefore, we must
have B ∈ E(m, t). Also, by maxiconsistency of end(m ⊓ h) and (A5), we will have
KB ∈ end(m ⊓ h). Therefore, by Case 3, we will have that M,m, h |= KB and
further, by B ∈ E(m, t), that M,m, h |= t:B. On the other hand, if t:B /∈ end(m⊓h),
then, since clearly m ⊓ h ∈ −→m, we must have B /∈ E(m, t), whence M,m, h 6|= t:B.
Case 5. A = Et for some t ∈ Pol. Then, given that m 6= † and |m| = 0, we have,
simply by definition of Act, that:
Et ∈ end(m ⊓ h)⇔ t ∈ Act(m,h)⇔M,m, h |= Et.
This finishes the list of the modal induction cases at hand, and thus the proof of
our truth lemma is complete.
5 The main result
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 2. The proof proceeds as follows. One
direction of the theorem was proved as Corollary 1. In the other direction, assume that
Γ ⊆ Form is consistent. Then, by Lemma 1.1, Γ can be extended to a maxiconsistent
∆. But then considerM = 〈Tree,✂, Choice, Act, R, E , V 〉, the canonical model defined
in Section 4. It is clear that (∆) is an element, therefore m = ([(∆)]≡, 0) ∈ Tree. By
Lemma 10, there is a history h ∈ Hm such that (∆) = ([(∆)]≡, 0) ⊓ h. For this h, we
will also have ∆ = end(([(∆)]≡, 0) ⊓ h). By Lemma 18, we therefore get that:
M, ([(∆)]≡, 0), h |= ∆ ⊇ Γ,
and thus Γ is shown to be satisfiable in a normal jstit unirelational model, hence in a
normal jstit model.
Remark. Note that the canonical model used in this proof is universal in the sense
that it satisfies every subset of Form which is consistent relative to Σ.
As an obvious corollary of Theorem 2 we get the compactness property:
Corollary 4. An arbitrary Γ ⊆ Form is satisfiable in a normal (unirelational) jstit
model iff every finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ is satisfiable in a normal (unirelational) jstit model.
The construction of the canonical model defined in Section 4 allows for a general-
ization. Let us call a constant specification any set CS such that:
• CS ⊆ {cn : . . . c1 :A | c1, . . . , cn ∈ PConst, A an instance of (A0)− (A9)};
• Whenever cn+1 :cn : . . . c1 :A ∈ CS, then also cn : . . . c1 :A ∈ CS.
For a given constant specification, we can define the corresponding inference rule RCS
as follows:
If cn : . . . c1 :A ∈ CS, infer cn : . . . c1 :A. (RCS)
It is easy to see that the least constant specification will be just ∅ and that R3 is in
fact RCS where CS is the following constant specification:
{c:A | c ∈ PConst, A an instance of (A0)− (A9)}.
We note that Theorem 2 is accordingly but a particular instance, obtained by setting
CS := CS, of the following more general theorem:
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Theorem 3. Let CS be a constant specification. Then an arbitrary Γ ⊆ Form is con-
sistent relative to the axiomatic system ΣCS = {(A0) − (A9), (R1), (R2), (R4), (RCS)}
iff Γ is satisfiable in an (unirelational) jstit model satisfying the following additional
condition:
(∀c ∈ PConst)(∀m ∈ Tree)({A | c:A ∈ CS} ⊆ E(m, c)).
We further note that the proof of this more general theorem can be obtained from
the proof of Theorem 2 above simply by replacing every reference to Σ = ΣCS by a
reference to ΣCS . We end this section by the observation that it follows from The-
orem 3 that the axiomatization of the validities over the whole unrestricted class of
(unirelational) jstit models is given by Σ∅ = {(A0)− (A9), (R1), (R2), (R4)}.
6 Conclusion
Building up on an earlier work on jstit formalisms, we have defined stit logic of
justification announcements (JA-STIT) — a natural logic which combines justification
logic with stit logic to provide a natural environment for representing proving activity
of agents within a (somewhat idealized) finite community of researchers. For this logic,
we have defined the semantics originally presented in [7]. The main import of this paper
is that JA-STIT admits of a strongly complete axiomatization w.r.t. this semantics
and that this axiomatization can be straighforwardly accommodated to a wide range
of possible constant specifications.
The main result of the present paper also leads to a number of natural questions
which we hope to be able to answer in our future publications. One problem is posed by
the fact, established in Proposition 1, that JA-STIT is expressive enough to distinguish
between the class of all jstit models and the class of all models based on discrete time.
This fact implies that our axiomatization will no longer be complete once the time
is assumed to be discrete. However, jstit models based on discrete time form a very
natural subclass within the class of jstit models, and it would be nice to find out how
to axiomatize our logic over this particular subclass.
Another problem for future research is finding a separate axiomatization for the
explicit fragment of basic jstit logic. It was mentioned above that even though in JA-
STIT one can retrieve explicit proving modalities of this logic, the inverse reduction
does not seem to go through, so that in terms of expressive power JA-STIT appears
to be a proper extension of the explicit fragment of basic jstit logic. A natural further
move would be then to find a separate axiomatization for the explicit fragment of basic
jstit logic and compare it to the axiomatization presented in this paper. Yet another
natural, although by no means trivial, further move would be to take on board also
the implicit version EA of Et-modality and axiomatize the full logic of E-notions.
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